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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is granted by Section 78-
2(a)-3 Utah Code. It is an appeal from a final judgment of The 
Fourth Judicial District Court For Millard County, State of Utah, 
assigned by the Utah Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
!
 1. Did the Fourth District Court violate Michael 
Turley's due process rights under the Utah and United States 
Constitutions by failing to give adequate notice of need to 
appoint counsel, trial, or entry of judgment, and by failing to 
advise him, and by denying him a him an opportunity to present 
his defenses at a hearing? 
Standard of Review: The question of whether the Trial 
Court strictly complied with procedural requirements is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See generally 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932, 956, 938 (Utah 1994). The Court of 
Appeals reviews a question of constitutional fact independently. 
State v. Vincent, 845 P.2d. 254 (Utah. App. 1992). 
This issue is preserved in the record at 122-128, 141, 
155-159, 175-181. 
2. Did the Fourth District Court err when it denied 
Michael Turley's Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b) (7)? 
Standard of review: An order denying a motion for 
relief from a default judgment is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion, but the trial court's discretion is narrow. The 
trial court must consider the importance of resolving a case on 
its merits and protecting the interest of both parties in 
presenting their case. Doubt as to the fairness of the default 
should result in a decision to set aside. Utah Department of 
Transportation v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d. 4, 8 (Utah 1995). The 
question of whether the trial court strictly complied with 
procedural requirements is a question of law that is reviewed f 
correctness. See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932, 936, 9 
(Utah 1994). If necessary, the question of whether the Trial 
Court correctly found that the Plaintiff Appellee would be 
prejudiced if the judgment is set aside should be reviewed as a 
finding of fact which is reviewed for clear error. State v. 
Blair, 868 P.2d. 802, 805, (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved in the record at 122-128, 14 
152-153, 180. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
1. Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party, (4) 
when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and 
the defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have perspective application; or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after 
9 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a 
party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining 
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
2. Utah Constitution Article 1 Section 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
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A STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final Judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court for Millard County, State of Utah. At the 
time of trial the Court ordered Turley's answer stricken and 
Default Judgment was entered. Record at 100. Turley's Motion For 
Relief To Set Aside Default Judgment was denied and this appeal 
followed. Record at 175. 
DeWolfs1 sued Turley regarding their purchase of 
Turley's home. Both parties obtained counsel. Turley went to 
China on a temporary employment assignment and while there he 
discharged his attorney because he did not think his attorney was 
representing him properly. Record at 141. His attorney filed a 
Notice of Withdrawal in August of 1995. Record at 54. It was 
difficult for Turley to receive mail in China. Some of his mail 
was sent to his brother in Nevada and was returned. Some of his 
mail went to Windsor, Connecticut, then to Hong Kong, then it was 
hand carried to China, and hand carried to Turley. Turley 
received some of his mail and he did not receive some of his 
mail. Sometimes mail was held at the Chinese border for 
inspection. Some of the Court's mail was returned. Record at 
123-124, 155. Notice to Appoint Counsel was sent on September 5, 
1995 but Turley does not recall receiving it. Record at 157. A 
Notice of non-jury Trial was sent on January 18, 1996 setting 
trial for February 15, 1996. Record at 66-67. Turley received 
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the Notice of Trial just two days before trial and immediately 
called the Court clerk to let the clerk know that he could not 
attend and requested a continuance. The clerk said she would 
inform the Court which she did. Record at 124, 156, phone 
message which is bottom unnumbered document on the left hand side 
of the file containing the record. At trial on February 15, 
1996, only plaintiff appeared and the Court ordered Turley's 
Answer stricken and Default was entered. Record at 100. On April 
18, 1996, the Court entered judgment in the amount of $24,587 
including $9,000 for a new well and 10,000 for emotional 
distress. Record at 100. Turley did not receive any 
communication from the Court after his phone call to the Court 
just before Trial until he returned to the United States 
approximately four and one half months later. Record at 156. 
Notice of Entry of Judgment was sent May 3, 1996. Record at 110. 
In late July or early August, Turley received notice that 
judgment had been entered against him and he immediately 
contacted his present counsel and filed a Motion For Relief From 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on August 22, 1996. Record at 
Record at 156. The Court entered an Order denying that motion on 
December 9, 1996. Record at 175. Addendum document two. 
12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. There was a constitutional violation. Notice 
violated due process because it was insufficient and untimely, no 
information regarding rights was given or any other 
accommodation, and there was no hearing. 
II. There was an abuse of discretion. The Rule 60(b) 
motion was filed timely. The court failed to consider lack of 
prejudice to the other party. The court also failed to give Mr. 
Turley any advice, or consider Mr. Turley1s good faith under 
difficult circumstances including being out of the country 
without reliable mail and being unrepresented. 
13 
ARGUMENT 
I. There was a denial of constitutional rights. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The Court of Appeals review a question of constitutional 
fact independently. State v. Vincent, 845 P. 2d 254 (Utah. App. 
1992) -
B. Notice of hearing and entry of judgment, and information 
regarding rights. 
When a layman is representing himself, he should be accorded 
every consideration that may be reasonably be indulged, and this 
would include giving him some information relating to his rights, 
and more than two days to prepare for trial. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 
669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all of 
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency 
of the action. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950). 
Notice must be more than a gesture. The effort must be as 
one who actually desires to give the absentee notice. Notice 
mailed to the last known address of a person not found within the 
state after diligent search does not satisfy due process. See 
Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981). 
In this case>, Mr. Turley while in China discharged his 
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attorney because he did not think his attorney was representing 
him properly. Record at 141. A notice to appoint counsel was 
sent to him but not received. Record at 157. He did not 
understand trial procedure and was surprised to learn that firing 
his attorney put him in jeopardy, and that the opposing attorney 
obtained judgment against him. Record at 156. 
He received notice of trial two days before his case was set 
for trial. He telephoned immediately from China where he was 
working and told the Court that he wanted the chance to defend 
his case on its merits, and he requested an extension so that he 
could be in the United States to present his defense. Record at 
156. The record contains the telephone message which Michael 
Turley left with the Judge two days before trial. It is the 
first document (unnumbered) on the left side of the folder which 
contains the record. See copy which is document one in Addendum. 
It is clear from the telephone message that the Court knew Turley 
needed a continuance of two to five months. The Court also knew 
that Turley was out of the country and about when he would 
return, that Turley wanted to present his case, and that he was 
unrepresented. It reads: 
February 13 - Michael Turley called from the 
Peoples Republic of China - he requested a continuance 
of the trial. He is not scheduled back in the United 
Stated until probably April-July or August. He and his 
attorney have had a miscommunication so he is 
representing himself. 
Someone picks up his mail and sends it to him and 
it takes a while to get to him. 
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Turley obviously got the notice of trial, but it came late 
due to circumstances beyond his control. The notice was mailed 
January 18 and was received on February 13, two days before 
trial. Record at 66, 156. 
Prior to the phone call, the Court knew that Mr. Turley was 
out of the country and that there was a problem with the mail. 
Documents filed with the court before this phone call show that 
the Court and the Parties knew Turley was working in China and 
that some of his correspondence had been returned. Record at 28, 
88-91. 
There is no evidence in the record that the Court attempted 
to give Mr. Turley any information regarding his rights. On the 
contrary, instead of trying to give him information regarding his 
rights or granting a continuance, the Court struck Turley1s 
pleadings and entered default two days later on the day of trial. 
Record at 17 6. 
After the judgment was entered the Dewolfs sent notice of 
the judgment again to Turley1s last known address. Again, Turley 
did not receive it. Record at 156. 
Based on Nelson and Mullane Turley was denied due process 
because of improper notice. Also, as a layman, Turley was not 
"...accorded every consideration that may be reasonably 
indulged..." The court gave him no notice to appoint counsel, 
and no information regarding his rights. Further, two to five 
months is not an unreasonably long continuance. Some Courts 
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cannot reschedule any faster than that using the first available 
date. In addition, there was not reasonable time to prepare and 
make an appearance. Even if Turley were in the United States he 
could probably not prepare adequately for trial in two days. Not 
only was there not time to prepare, but there was not even time 
to travel from where he was in China to timely appear at trial 
unprepared. 
Finally the notice was not reasonably calculated to give 
adequate notice under Graham. The Court and Dewolfs knew that 
there was a problem with the mail. Simply mailing to Turley1s 
last known address the notice to appoint counsel, of trial , and 
entry of judgment while knowing he is out of state and while 
knowing that the mail will probably not reach him or will reach 
him late is a only a gesture and does not satisfy due process. 
This is especially true when there is a reasonable alternative 
like a continuance. 
C. Denial of a hearing. 
The Court should afford the parties an opportunity to make 
their appearance and present their objections. Mullane at 314. 
Dewolfs filed a very detailed complaint, and Turley in his 
answer denied the allegations specifically. Record at 1-12, 13-
19. The Court struck Turley's answer on the date of the trial as 
stated above. 
Turley is convinced that he has meritorious defenses. In 
fact he thinks that Dewolfs claim that the well water was 
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contaminated is legally insufficient and is subject to summary 
judgment because Dewolfs ordered and paid for an independent 
study of the water before the sale which showed the water was 
satisfactory. Record at 128. Turley cannot find in the record 
where Dewolfs disclosed their study to the court at the time of 
trial. If this information was not disclosed it constitutes a 
failure to disclose material information to the Court. In 
addition, under these circumstances the Dewolfs cannot legally 
claim reliance on any alleged representation about the quality of 
the water by Turley. In addition, Turley has other evidence 
relating to Dewolfs claims of delay and lack of cooperation 
which he thinks the Court was unaware of at the time of trial. 
Based on Mullane and the fact that the Court denied Turley 
opportunity to present his defenses, this Court should rule that 
Turley1s constitutional right to a hearing was violated. 
II. There was an abuse of discretion. 
A. Standard of Review 
The question presented to the Court of Appeals is whether 
the trial erred by failing to set aside a judgment. The question 
of whether the trial court strictly complied with procedural 
requirements is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. See generally State v. Pena, 896 P.2d. 932, 936, 938 
(Utah 1994). The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court 
decision regarding the motion for relief from a judgement for 
18 
abuse of discretion, but this discretionary power must not be 
used arbitrarily, but must have been used reasonably and 
according to the law. Naisbitt v. Herrick 290 P 950, 953 (Utah 
1930). The law narrows the trial court's discretion regarding a 
motion to set aside a default judgement, in order to accomplish 
justice by requiring the trial court to accept any reasonable 
cause for the default, and to resolve doubt in favor of hearing 
the merits of that case. 
The Supreme Court of Utah explains: 
[A] court should be generally indulgent toward 
permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so 
they can be settled advisedly and in conformity with 
law and justice. To clamp a judgement rigidly and 
irrevocably on a party without hearing is obviously a 
harsh and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our 
system of justice that each party should be afforded an 
opportunity to present his side of the case. For that 
reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgement 
where there is reasonable justification or excuse for 
the defendant's failure to appear, and timely 
application is made to set it aside. 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 376 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah 
1962). The Supreme Court further clarifies the test for abuse of 
discretion, saying: 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch 
. . . But it is even more important to keep in mind 
that the very reason for existence of courts is to 
afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do 
justice between them. In conformity with that 
principle the courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgements where there is any 
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. 
Westinghouse El. Sup. Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Con., Inc., 544 P.2d 
19 
876, 879 (Utah 1975)(the Utah Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court for failing to give proper weight to the higher priority ). 
Where there is doubt about whether a default judgement should be 
set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of hearing the 
case, so that the resolution may be just. Interstate Excavating 
v. Agla Development, 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980); cf. Locke v. 
Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1955). See also 
generally State by & through P. of S.S. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 
1053, 1055 (Utah 1983)(agreeing that the courts should be liberal 
in granting relief from default so that controversies may be 
tried on the merits); Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 
1976) (the discretion is not unrestrained, action must be within 
reason and good conscience to protect both parties and serve 
justice, doubt is resolved to favor giving both parties a day in 
court for trial on the merits); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. 
Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973) (the court desires to 
protect the party that has not had the opportunity to present 
claim or defense, relief granted where movant shows diligence and 
that circumstances prevented his appearance); Heathman v. Fabian 
& Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962) (the court should 
disfavor default judgements in the interest of justice and fair 
play). 
Finally, review of the trial court's decision regarding 
whether setting aside the judgement would prejudice the non-
20 
moving party, the Court of Appeals should consider the question 
of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Blair, 
862 P.2d. 802, 805, (Utah 1993). 
B. Rule 60 (b) was appropriately but incorrectly applied 
when the trial court denied the Motion for Relief from Judgement 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) governs motions to set 
aside judgments, such as Mr. Turley's Motion for Relief from 
Judgment. The rule organizes the comprehensive set of reasons to 
justify relief into seven subsections. The rule explicitly 
states that in order to move under subsections (1) - (4) the 
motion must be submitted within three months of the entry of 
judgment. Under subsection (7), the court may relieve a party 
from a default judgement for "any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgement," so long as the motion is 
made within a reasonable time. Motions that are properly 
considered under subsections (1) through (6) are not considered 
under subsection (7). Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1304, 1306 - 1307 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert Chipman 
and Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); cf Memorandum 
Decision 1 16. 
The Appellant, Michael Turley, agrees with the trial court 
decision to consider his Motion for Relief from Judgement under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) (7), which allows the court 
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to set aside a default judgement in the interests of justice. 
Memorandum Decision 11 14, 16 - 17, 19 - 25, Record at 178-180. 
It was within the discretion of the trial court to determine 
whether or not the motion properly fit under subsection (1) 
covering mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect 
(Larsen v. Collins, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).), or within the 
other subsections of Rule 60 (b). Appellant does not challenge 
the trial courts decision to consider his motion as it was made, 
under subsection (7), rather than under the time-barred 
subsections. Because circumstances beyond Mr. Turley's control 
prevented him from presenting his case at trial in spite of his 
diligent efforts to protect his interests, subsection (7) should 
be applied, in harmony with the trial, courts proper, reasonable, 
legal discretion as set out above. r^ 
However, the trial court applied the wrong procedure by 
substituting the three month time limit which Rule 60 (b) imposes 
on motions made under subsections (1) through (4) to Mr. Turley's 
subsection (7) motion. Cf Memorandum Decision 11 18 & 22, Record 
at 180. Instead of substituting the time limit applicable to 
subsections (1) through (4), the trial court was required to 
apply reasonable discretion to the facts of the case, 
"considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason 
for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier 
of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties." 
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Memorandum Decision 1 14, citing Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259, 
261 (Utah App. 1992); Record 178. The trial court was also 
required to give substantial weight to the importance of hearing 
the merits and giving both parties the opportunity to prove their 
case, as detailed above. See supra, Standard of Review. Delay 
in sending the notice of judgment is a factor in determining 
timeliness of later challenges. Workman v. Nagle const., Co. 802 
P.2d 749, 751 (Utah App. 1990). Moving for relief within a month 
after learning of the judgment has been considered reasonable. 
Workman at 752. The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial 
court so the correct procedural law can be applied. 
C. The Court failed to consider willfulness, bad faith, and 
fault in the decision to impose sanctions and in considering the 
motion to set aside judgment. 
The trial court should have required a showing of 
willfulness, fault, or bad faith before imposing sanctions on 
Turley's failure to appear at trial. "The sanctions imposed 
[default judgement] require a showing of [defendant's] 
willfulness, bad faith, or fault." Utah Dept. of Transp. v. 
Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995); citing First Fed. Savings 
and Loan Ass'n v. Schamaneck , 684 P.2d at 1266 (quoting National 
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 
S.Ct. 2778, 2779, 49 L.Ed.2d 747, 749 (1976)). The Utah Supreme 
Court emphasized that "Imposing sanctions for a party's refusal 
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to respond to a court order compelling discovery is a harsh 
sanction and therefor, requires a showing of willfulness, bad 
faith, or fault on the part of the non-complying party," although 
failure to make a finding of bad faith is not fatal if the record 
allows the appeals court to gain a full understanding of the 
circumstances. Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
950, 961 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In Arnica, the Supreme Court inferred a finding of bad faith 
from a record showing "aggravated misconduct" in the form of 
willful disobedience to discovery orders, fabricated testimony, 
and witness tampering. Arnica, 961 - 962. Likewise, in Utah 
Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, the Utah Supreme Court found 
adequate facts and circumstances support the refusal of a Rule 60 
(b) motion when the record revealed that defendant Osguthorpe had 
"multiple and repeated opportunities to assert his claims and 
positions and has flagrantly neglected to do so." 892 P.2d 4, 8-9 
(Utah 1995). Defendant Osguthorpe went through two attorneys, 
both of whom withdrew from representing him. He ignored 
discovery requests for more than a year. He was living in the 
state and receiving all notices and communications about the case 
during the entire time of his willful disobedience. Osguthorpe 
attempted to deal directly with Governor Bangerter rather than 
with the court. He lied in his affidavits. (Id. 4-7). 
In this case, Turley hired a lawyer. He fired that lawyer 
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when he thought that lawyer was doing a poor job. Record at 141. 
Even while unrepresented, and out of state and under almost 
impossible circumstances, he attempted to responded to the 
requirements of the Court, but as a layman he did not understand 
the procedural requirements involved in preparing his trial 
defense. 
In addition, Turley could not find competent counsel from 
China, or work with counsel to develop his defense without 
adequate communication. 
Turley did ask the Court for a continuance and gave the 
court some suggestions on when he could attend trial. 
As stated in Mr. Turley's affidavits dated August 21 and 
October 18, 1996, in support of his motion to set aside, Mr. 
Turley explained that he was in China on assignment from his 
employer to start up a power plant, to teach the Chinese how to 
run the plant, and to turn the plant over to them once they 
learned. This required him to work twelve-hour days. Record at 
123-124. In addition, it was difficult for him to receive mail. 
His mail went to Windsor, Connecticut, then to Hong Kong, then it 
was hand carried to the Guang Dong Province of China. The mail 
had to pass through Chinese customs and where it was sometimes 
held at the border for inspection. As a consequence, Mr. Turley 
often received his mail late, and sometimes not at all. Record 
at 155, 123-123. 
Based on the authority cited above, the trial court's error 
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in deciding to deny the Motion for Relief from judgment was 
especially grievous considering that the court did not apply 
appropriate standards while making the decision to grant the 
default in the first place. 
The record in the instant case demonstrates that the trial 
court expressly refused to weigh the appropriate circumstantial 
factors. When it decided to grant the default, the trial court 
knew that Mr. Turley wanted to comply with procedural 
requirements but was prevented from it by poor communications 
between The People's Republic of China and Utah. Memorandum 
Decision ff 7, Record at 176. 
Nevertheless, the trial court entered default against Mr. 
Turley because he ttfail[ed] to comply and cooperate with 
discovery, . . . as well as his failure to appear at either 
scheduled pretrial conferences or the non-jury trial," without 
any finding of willfulness, bad faith, or fault or a full 
consideration of the circumstances. Memorandum Decision $ 8, 
Record at 176. 
The trial court again failed to consider the lack of 
willfulness, bad faith, fault, or Mr. Turley's circumstances or 
his diligent efforts to preserve his rights when the trial court 
denied the motion to set aside the default judgment, in spite of 
memoranda and affidavits reminding the court of the 
circumstances. The record demonstrates that the trial court 
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expressly refused to give any weight to these factors. The 
Memorandum Decision notes Mr. Turley's affidavits as 
"allegations" (f 19), but refutes them without authority by 
declaring that 
pro se individuals have the same responsibilities in 
representing themselves as if they had retained 
counsel, and that it was the Defendant's responsibility 
to remain appraised of the court proceedings, as well 
as to ensure that an avenue of reliable communication 
existed to maintain contact between the parties." 
Memorandum Decision f 20 (emphasis added), Record at 179. The 
trial court also declared that "Defendant's alleged 
inaccessibility should not be capable of eviscerating those 
limitations and procedures [referring to the time limits and 
rules of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]." Memorandum Decision f 
21, Record at 179, The trial court deliberately refused to 
consider Mr. Turley's lack of experience in legal matters, lack 
of legal training or education, efforts to preserve his right to 
present a defense, efforts to obtain competent representation, 
the difficulties in maintaining communication between the parties 
from half way around the world, or Turley's inability to control 
these circumstances within the context of the case. 
Dewolfs argued to the Court that Turley returned his mail, 
but there is no evidence of bad faith with respect to returning 
mail. It is true that some mail was returned, and it is also 
true that Turley told his brother in Nevada to return all of his 
mail for a few weeks, after which his brother resumed forwarding 
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the mail. Record at 156. The Court seemed to find the returned 
mail significant in refusing to set aside the judgment. Record 
at 187. However, returning the mail was not a factor with 
respect to the trial notice because the notice was received and 
Turley responded to it. Even if important mail is returned, it 
is not automatically bad faith. There are other possible 
explanations, and the issue is as most a question of fact. 
In addition, the Court seemed to think it was significant 
that Turley had not responded to discovery. Record at 100. Some 
interrogatories and requests for production were mailed to Turley 
while he had counsel, but the requests for admissions were mailed 
on December 26, 1995, after Turley1s counsel had withdrawn on 
August 28, 1995. Record at 54, 63. Not only is it unreasonable 
to expect a layman to understand the purpose of request for 
admissions, but there is no indication in the record that Turley 
received them. These admissions were later deemed admitted and 
formed a basis for the motion for summary judgment. Further, 
it appears from the record that the admissions were sent by 
Dewolfs with knowledge that Turley was out of the country and 
probably would not receive them. Record at 88, 108. Did Dewolfs 
send the requests for admissions with the intent that Turley 
would not receive them? These were detailed admissions on every 
issue of the case. Did Dewolfs plan to take advantage of Turley 
by sending the requests to an address they knew would not work 
without making any effort to make a good faith attempt to serve 
28 
Turley? 
Lastly, although the issued was argued, the trial court 
failed to consider whether there was prejudice to the other 
parties. Turley argued that a twenty-six day delay did not 
create prejudice for Dewolfs. Judgment was entered April 18, and 
notice of the judgment was sent May 3. This delay in sending the 
notice should be weighed with other factors as stated in Workman. 
Turley returned to the United States on July 2, and received 
notice of the judgment in late July or early August. Record at 
156. Turley's motion to set aside was filed August 28. Record 
at 135, 156. Thus Turley filed his motion to set aside with 
thirty days after learning of the judgment. The Dewolfs also 
argued the issue of prejudice by arguing that a trial in this 
case would reopen emotional wounds and thereby cause prejudice. 
Record at 137. It does not seem appropriate for plaintiffs to 
claim prejudice because of stress when their claims go to trial, 
but in any event, the Court did not address any of these issues 
of prejudice in its decision. Record at 186. 
2 9 
CONCLUSION 
Michael Turley requests that the Appellate Court reverse the 
Trial Court by overturning the default judgment, reinstating his 
answer, allowing him an opportunity to respond to Dewolfs 
requests for admissions, and directing the Trial Court hear the 
case at a trial on the merits. 
Dated this [ft day of r ^ f , 1997. 
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EDWARD L. AND BRENDA J. DEWOLF 
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vs. 
MICHAEL V. TURLEY, 
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 940401013 
DATE: December 9, 1996 
JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Default 
Judgment on October 24, 1996. Both parties have had the opportunity to submit written 
memorandum, and argue their position to the Court, both being represented by counsel. The 
Court, having received and reviewed the motion, including memorandum in support and 
memorandum in opposition, having heard the argument of counsel, and having reviewed the 
applicable law, now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on May 26, 1994. At the 
time the Complaint was filed, the Defendant's address was listed as 300 East 173 South in 
Delta, Utah. 
2. Defendant's attorney, D. Kevin DeGraw, filed his Notice of Withdrawal of 
Counsel on August 29, 1995. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs attorney, Richard C. Coxson, filed 
a Notice to Appear or Appoint on September 5, 1995. At the time the Defendant's attorney 
withdrew, the Defendant's address was listed as P.O. Box 163 in Logandale, Nevada. 
3. On October 2, 1995, the Plaintiffs' Request for Pretrial was filed. In accordance 
with that request, a notice stating that the Pretrial Conference would be held on December 
21, 1995 was sent to the Plaintiffs and Defendant. The Defendant was given the option to 
handle the matter telephonically if it would be more convenient. This Pretrial Conference 
was not held on December 21, 1995, but was reset as a Telephonic Pretrial Conference, to 
be heard on January 18, 1996. Notice was sent to the Defendant's Logandale, Nevada 
address. The Plaintiff's attorney initiated the telephone conference call, but the Defendant's 
phone number was unavailable. At that time, the trial date was set for February 15, 1996. 
4. On January 18, 1996, notice of the non-jury trial setting was filed with this Court. 
Notice that trial was set for February 15, 1996 was sent to the Defendant's Logandale, 
Nevada address. 
5. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs attempted to contact the Defendant at the 
Logandale, Nevada address via mail on at least four occasions, and that those letters were 
refused. 
6. The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Deem 
Admissions Admitted on February 5, 1996. This Court, finding that the admissions were 
sent to, and subsequently refused by, the Defendant, and the time within which the 
Defendant could respond having elapsed, entered its Order Deeming Admissions Admitted on 
February 15, 1996. 
7. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs were present with counsel before this Court on 
February 15, 1996, but that Defendant was not present, having telephoned to request a 
continuance. At that time, this Court ordered the Defendant's Answer stricken, and a 
Default Order was entered. 
8. On April 18, 1996, this Court's Order of Judgment was filed. In its Order, the 
Court noted the following: the Defendant refused the Plaintiffs' discovery requests; the 
Defendant failed to appear, either in person or telephonically, at both scheduled pretrial 
conferences; the Plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions dealt with remaining issues of facts in 
the matter, and Defendant did not timely respond to those requests; and Defendant failed to 
respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, based on the Defendant's 
failure to comply and cooperate with discovery, as well as his failure to appear at either 
scheduled pretrial conferences or the non-jury trial, this Court entered a default judgment. 
9. On May 3, 1996, the Plaintiffs mailed a Notice of Entry of Judgment to the 
Defendant at his Logandale, Nevada address. 
10. This Court granted an Ex Parte Order of Attachment to the Plaintiffs, filed on 
July 30, 1996, which attached the Defendant's Piper PA-22, SN 22-5388, as listed by the 
FAA. The Defendant was sent notice of Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion and Affidavit in Support 
of and Order of Attachment at the Logandale, Nevada address. 
11. The Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on August 22, 1996 
pursuant to Rules 55 and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
12. This Court finds that the Defendant discharged his attorney while out of the 
country, believing that he was not being represented well. Aff. of Michael V. Turley, 1 2, 
filed September 9, 1996. The Defendant, upon his return to the United States, sought out 
and appointed his present counsel. Aff. of Michael V. Turley, 1 2, filed October 21, 1996. 
This Court also notes that the Defendant alleges it was difficult for him to receive mail while 
out of the country, and that failure to receive court notices, as well as work obligations, 
resulted in his failure to appear at trial and the default judgment. Aff. of Michael V. Turley, 
11 12-16, filed August 22, 1996. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure (URCP) 55(c) grants courts the discretion to set 
aside an entry of default for good cause shown, "and, if a judgment by default has been 
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." See also, Arnica Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Calder Bros. Co. v. 
Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
2. URCP 60(b) grants courts, upon motion, the discretion to set aside a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding under certain circumstances, including "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."1 However, this Court also finds that 
this discretionary power "'should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court only 
in unusual and exceptional instances.'" Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Ass'n. 657 
P.2d 1304, 1307-08 (Utah 1982), quoting Hughes v. Sanders. 287 F. Supp. 332, 334 
(E.D.Okl. 1968). 
3. In addition, this Court finds that a Rule 60(b) motion relying on grounds (5) 
through (7) does not have to be made within three months, but it must be made within a 
reasonable time: 
The decision not to limit the right to raise these challenges within a set time 
period reflects the seriousness of the issues. . . . In general, under all of these 
provisions the moving party need show only that she acted diligently once the 
basis for relief became available, and that the delay in seeking relief did not 
cause undue hardship to the opposing party. 
Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 752 (Utah App. 1990), quoting J. 
Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 12.6 at 574 (1985). In determining 
what constitutes a reasonable time, this Court finds that the determination depends upon the 
facts of each case, "considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for delay, 
the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to 
other parties." Maertz v. Maertz. 827 P.2d 259, 261 (Utah App. 1992). 
4. This Court finds that subdivision (5) permits setting aside a default judgment in 
cases of a void judgment. A judgment will be deemed void only in cases where the court 
1
 Other circumstances warranting relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
include the following: mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence not discoverable for purposes of Rule 59(b); fraud, misrepresentation, or 
other misconduct by an adverse party; defendant was not personally served with a summons, 
and failed to appear; judgment is void; judgment was satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment on which the present judgment was based was reversed or vacated, or it 
would be inequitable if the prior judgment had prospective application. URCP R. 60(b)(l)-(6) 
(1996). 
rendering the judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the parties or the subject 
matter. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons. 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
5. This Court finds that subdivision (7), the residuary clause of rule 60(b), has three 
requirements: (1) the basis for setting aside judgment cannot be the same as those found in 
subdivisions (1) through (6); (2) the reason must justify relief; and (3) the motion must be 
made within a reasonable time. Laub at 1306-07. 
6. Furthermore, this Court finds that, when making a determination on a motion to 
set aside a default judgment, the claim's merits are generally not re-examined, because the 
courts are mainly concerned "only with why a party failed to answer, not with the merits of 
any defense he might offer." International Resources v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d 513, 515 (Utah 
1979). 
7. This Court finds that, due to the three month time limitation established in Rule 
60(b)(l)-(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to make a motion for setting aside a default 
judgment, Defendant cannot successfully raise those in its Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. Plaintiff mailed the Notice of Entry of Judgment to the Defendant on May 3, 
1996, and the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed on August 22, 
1996. Clearly, more than three months had elapsed before Defendant's motion was filed. 
8. This Court finds that, if counsel for a party has withdrawn, that party will either 
appoint new counsel, or may proceed pro se. In the event new counsel is not appointed, pro 
se individuals have the same responsibilities in representing themselves as if they had 
retained counsel. Therefore, this Court finds that the Defendant was responsible for 
maintaining his own defense from the time his first attorney withdrew to the time he 
appointed new counsel. As such, it was the Defendant's responsibility to remain apprised of 
the court proceedings, as well as to ensure that an avenue of reliable communication existed 
to maintain contact between the parties. 
9. With respect to Defendant's reliance on Rule 60(b)(7), this Court finds that 
reliance ill-founded. It is not incumbent upon this Court to re-examine the merits of 
\Qh 
Defendant's assertions; this Court need only examine the basis for Defendant's failure to 
appear. In examining the record, this Court finds that the time limits and procedures 
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were adhered to, and the Defendant's 
alleged inaccessibility should not be capable of eviscerating those limitations and procedures. 
10. In addition, this Court finds that Defendant has not satisfied the requirements for 
maintaining a Rule 60(b)(7) motion. In filing his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment over 
three months from the date the Notice of Judgment was entered, this Court finds that the 
Defendant has not presented its motion within a reasonable time. 
11. This Court finds that, because the actions and property involved in the dispute 
were located in Millard County, and as the parties at the time the Complaint was filed were 
residents of Millard County, it properly exercised jurisdiction over the matter; therefore, this 
Court finds Rule 60(b)(5) inapplicable to the present case. 
12. In oral argument, the Defendant cited Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 
1983) as dispositive on the issue of whether he was given timely and adequate notice of the 
trial. This Court finds that Nelson v. Jacobsen stood for the principle that "where notice is 
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the proceedings against him or 
not given sufficiently in advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived 
of due process." Id. at 1212. In Nelson, the court informed the defendant that his case was 
scheduled for a hearing approximately two weeks later, meaning that the matter was 
scheduled for a non-jury trial. The defendant misunderstood the court's ruling, and received 
an order scheduling the case for trial and notice of the trial date two days before the trial. 
This Court finds the facts of Nelson distinguishable from the facts in the case at issue. Here, 
the Defendant was sent notice of the trial on January 18, 1996, over twenty-five days prior to 
the trial date of February 15, 1996. Defendant argues that, due to his inaccessibility, he did 
not receive notice sufficiently in advance of the trial date to prepare, but Defendant 
obfuscates the procedural requirement. In terms of procedural due process, notice must be 
reasonably calculated to inform parties of the pendency of the action. Notice sent over 
twenty-five days prior to the trial date is sufficient to satisfy this requirement. 
13. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Defendant's 
Motion for Relief from Judgement is DENIED. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this / Q\ day of December, 1996. 
THE COURT: 
iQX 
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